Firmware TPM rollback weakens Windows Hello and BitLocker PIN protection
Researchers demonstrated physical attacks that roll back the failed-attempt state of some firmware TPMs. On their test setups, measured attempt rates yielded worst-case estimates of 40 hours for a four-digit Windows Hello PIN and 20 days for a six-digit BitLocker startup PIN.
- Disclosed
- Nov 14, 2026
- Updated Nov 16, 2026
- Severity
- Sharted
- No CVE: a breach, not a bug
- Splash zone
- Physically accessible Windows devices with affected AMD firmware TPM configurations or Winbond RPMC flash.
- Windows Hello · BitLocker · TPM · firmware
- In the wild
- Not seen
- Researchers demonstrated the attacks in the lab. No real-world exploitation was reported.
What happened
A firmware TPM (fTPM) can store encrypted state, including failed PIN attempts, on external SPI flash. Some systems use a replay-protected monotonic counter (RPMC) on the flash to stop old state from being accepted. The researchers showed that a physical attacker who can alter flash contents or interpose on the board’s SPI bus can restore earlier state across reboots and bypass persistent PIN lockouts on affected hardware. Their Windows Hello test still allowed only five attempts per boot.
On the AMD path tested on an HP OmniBook 3 15-fn0523ng, suppressing a counter increment left the platform treating it as successful. The team also observed comparable unverified counter increments with Pluton enabled on that device. On an Intel Framework Laptop 13 with Winbond 25R256JW flash, extracting the flash authentication key enabled forged counter responses. The researchers also rolled back state on two tested AMD systems without RPMC by restoring an old flash image. These results establish specific attack paths and test configurations. A device’s actual firmware and flash determine its exposure.
The authors tested Windows Hello on the HP device and BitLocker’s TPM+PIN protector on the Framework device. The 40-hour and 20-day figures are worst-case estimates from measured attempt rates on their setups. Their model raises those estimates to 168 days for a six-digit numeric Hello PIN and about six years for an eight-digit numeric BitLocker PIN. Longer PINs increase guessing cost while the rollback weakness remains. The paper reports no CVE for the Windows Hello case and gives no verified firmware or silicon fix for the principal AMD and Winbond issues at publication.
Crime-scene timeline
Nov 14, 2026
ACM publishes the Hello Again paper
The researchers describe firmware TPM rollback on tested AMD and Intel configurations and demonstrate attacks against Windows Hello and BitLocker.
Nov 16, 2026
Researchers document how to check AMD systems for RPMC
Their repository explains the Linux firmware security attributes and what missing attributes mean.
Who said what
We list each claim and who made it. Primary sources (the vendor, the researcher, the registry) are marked. Where reports disagree, we grade by the worst credible case.
- Hello Again research paperPrimaryDocuments the attack prerequisites, measured attempt rates, affected test hardware, vendor responses and interim mitigations.
- ACM proceedings metadataPrimaryRecords November 14 as the publication date of the proceedings paper.
- Researchers’ RPMC repositoryPrimaryGives hardware identification guidance and explains how to check AMD RPMC attributes.
- Microsoft Windows Hello for Business policy settingsPrimaryDocuments the policy for setting the minimum length of Windows Hello for Business PINs.
- Microsoft BitLocker configurationPrimaryDocuments the separate minimum length policy for BitLocker startup PINs.