CVE Index中文
L3 · ShartedScreenConnect · Remote accessscreenconnect-fake-crypto-guests

Fake cryptocurrency hosts enroll in self-hosted ScreenConnect servers

Huntress observed emulated ScreenConnect guests with exchange-themed names on at least 118 self-hosted servers in 109 protected organizations. The guests could lure technicians into opening sessions.

Disclosed
Nov 14, 2026
Public disclosure date
Severity
Sharted
No CVE: a breach, not a bug
Splash zone
Reachable self-hosted ScreenConnect relays known to the operator. File execution needs a vulnerable client and active session.
ScreenConnect · Remote access
In the wild
Unknown
Huntress confirmed unauthorized registrations and saw no guest-to-host exploitation.

What happened

Huntress found an installer publicly downloadable on the first server it examined. A guest needs the relay address embedded in the installer. The report gives 2,408 registrations in its summary and 2,223 in the body, without reconciling the two totals. It observed no guest pushing or running files. One technician used Send Text twice and the content was not retained, so Huntress treated it as possible credential exposure. The researchers list the separate SCKit campaign as context and report no match to its published indicators. CVE-2026-84869 is a possible attack path for the lures.

Hunting indicators

  • 74.208.158[.]106 — Source of 97.8% of observed connections
  • 197.47.160[.]252 — Earliest three registrations
  • 87.106.111[.]220 — Shares JARM and TLS certificates with the main IP, with no observed guest sessions
  • SHA256:kt6iiIS3kcQ3NsUSVfk7gJoGMSSUqMdXqsmjb+/cSHg — ECDSA SSH host key fingerprint for the main IP
  • 25.3.4.9288, ClientType 1, empty guest key — Claimed guest version and emulator fingerprint
  • KUCOIN-SRV, LAPTOP-BINANCE, BACKUP-PROBIT, WORKSTATION-COINEX — Example exchange and role names, often with blank company and site
  • ScreenConnect.WindowsClient.exe → cmd.exe / powershell.exe / wscript.exe / msiexec.exe — Look for launches using files under Documents*\Temp. This is a possible sign of guest-to-host execution, not an observed outcome here.

SHA-256 hashes of the fake WebP previews published by Huntress.

  • 008839ef2a2d54e9efa47013bb23c773d3a152f351e9dfd3b2f4dd27086121df
  • 45136a9ab47015c4334b881df9daf824a72347daae0b5730ce3bd7d42b204bf2
  • e73020645e7a11a90865d93bd7f3d797585f49ef72b1ac7354392a2da7fbd91f
  • c15b008b0296b1bc9e0f979e6f25b780e3e89edabb344c7ee8c284a1a140f0d7
  • b55ce5130cd2623017cca29318341f6b4656e3a1dc5ab82ce704e912d0d17535
  • bea82efc82672225cf29eb869972670754f15941bc61b9e5801ffd41c5c39e5f
  • f6d37291c4948b974caf2e9e7e8ca9c2173d2779d1ec0a391488706bbd1a995c

Crime-scene timeline

  1. Nov 3, 2026 21:26 UTC

    First three entries appear

    Huntress traces the earliest entries to 197.47.160[.]252.

  2. Nov 12, 2026

    An MSP asks Huntress to investigate

    The server contained unexpected entries but showed no evidence of web shells, suspicious child processes or new accounts.

  3. Nov 14, 2026

    Huntress publishes its investigation

    Its telemetry found new entries from November 3 through 13 and included a possible sensitive-text exposure.

Who said what

We list each claim and who made it. Primary sources (the vendor, the researcher, the registry) are marked. Where reports disagree, we grade by the worst credible case.