Fake cryptocurrency hosts enroll in self-hosted ScreenConnect servers
Huntress observed emulated ScreenConnect guests with exchange-themed names on at least 118 self-hosted servers in 109 protected organizations. The guests could lure technicians into opening sessions.
- Disclosed
- Nov 14, 2026
- Public disclosure date
- Severity
- Sharted
- No CVE: a breach, not a bug
- Splash zone
- Reachable self-hosted ScreenConnect relays known to the operator. File execution needs a vulnerable client and active session.
- ScreenConnect · Remote access
- In the wild
- Unknown
- Huntress confirmed unauthorized registrations and saw no guest-to-host exploitation.
What happened
Huntress found an installer publicly downloadable on the first server it examined. A guest needs the relay address embedded in the installer. The report gives 2,408 registrations in its summary and 2,223 in the body, without reconciling the two totals. It observed no guest pushing or running files. One technician used Send Text twice and the content was not retained, so Huntress treated it as possible credential exposure. The researchers list the separate SCKit campaign as context and report no match to its published indicators. CVE-2026-84869 is a possible attack path for the lures.
Hunting indicators
74.208.158[.]106— Source of 97.8% of observed connections197.47.160[.]252— Earliest three registrations87.106.111[.]220— Shares JARM and TLS certificates with the main IP, with no observed guest sessionsSHA256:kt6iiIS3kcQ3NsUSVfk7gJoGMSSUqMdXqsmjb+/cSHg— ECDSA SSH host key fingerprint for the main IP25.3.4.9288, ClientType 1, empty guest key— Claimed guest version and emulator fingerprintKUCOIN-SRV, LAPTOP-BINANCE, BACKUP-PROBIT, WORKSTATION-COINEX— Example exchange and role names, often with blank company and siteScreenConnect.WindowsClient.exe → cmd.exe / powershell.exe / wscript.exe / msiexec.exe— Look for launches using files under Documents*\Temp. This is a possible sign of guest-to-host execution, not an observed outcome here.
SHA-256 hashes of the fake WebP previews published by Huntress.
008839ef2a2d54e9efa47013bb23c773d3a152f351e9dfd3b2f4dd27086121df45136a9ab47015c4334b881df9daf824a72347daae0b5730ce3bd7d42b204bf2e73020645e7a11a90865d93bd7f3d797585f49ef72b1ac7354392a2da7fbd91fc15b008b0296b1bc9e0f979e6f25b780e3e89edabb344c7ee8c284a1a140f0d7b55ce5130cd2623017cca29318341f6b4656e3a1dc5ab82ce704e912d0d17535bea82efc82672225cf29eb869972670754f15941bc61b9e5801ffd41c5c39e5ff6d37291c4948b974caf2e9e7e8ca9c2173d2779d1ec0a391488706bbd1a995c
Crime-scene timeline
Nov 3, 2026 21:26 UTC
First three entries appear
Huntress traces the earliest entries to 197.47.160[.]252.
Nov 12, 2026
An MSP asks Huntress to investigate
The server contained unexpected entries but showed no evidence of web shells, suspicious child processes or new accounts.
Nov 14, 2026
Huntress publishes its investigation
Its telemetry found new entries from November 3 through 13 and included a possible sensitive-text exposure.
Who said what
We list each claim and who made it. Primary sources (the vendor, the researcher, the registry) are marked. Where reports disagree, we grade by the worst credible case.
- Huntress investigationPrimaryDocuments emulated guests, observed scope, session history, indicators and remediation.
- ConnectWise September 8 bulletinPrimaryDocuments the file-transfer flaw, fixed technician client and permission workaround.