CVE Index中文
L4 · Septic Tank BlewAWS · IAM · supply chainqubole-aws-role-abuse

Stolen Qubole-linked AWS credentials were used to enter customer accounts

Wiz and Sentra traced an attacker using IAM credentials from an AWS account associated with Qubole to assume integration roles. The actor stole S3 data and accessed secrets that could reach AWS, Entra ID and Okta. Dormant trust policies still granted access.

Disclosed
Nov 9, 2026
Public disclosure date
Severity
Septic Tank Blew
No CVE: a breach, not a bug
Splash zone
AWS accounts with IAM roles trusting the Qubole-linked account, including unused integrations.
AWS · IAM · supply chain
In the wild
Yes
Wiz and Sentra observed unauthorized role assumption and access to customer AWS resources.

What happened

The attacker presented the expected External ID to obtain temporary credentials for roles that still trusted the Qubole-linked account. The role policies determined what was reachable. Management events can show role assumptions and bucket enumeration. S3 object reads require data events or server access logs. The research does not explain how the vendor credentials were acquired. Wiz noted a third-party report of a claim of responsibility on November 11 and has not established attribution.

Crime-scene timeline

  1. Oct 8–11, 2026

    Wiz observes separate customer-key activity

    An actor used customer-owned keys believed to have been created for Qubole. Wiz has not linked this activity to the later role assumptions.

  2. Oct 14–26, 2026

    Attacker assumes customer integration roles

    Wiz observes secret harvesting, checks of stolen credentials and S3 exfiltration.

  3. Nov 9, 2026

    Wiz and Sentra disclose their findings

    They publish role-assumption and data-access hunting guidance.

Who said what

We list each claim and who made it. Primary sources (the vendor, the researcher, the registry) are marked. Where reports disagree, we grade by the worst credible case.