What happened
These are three separate bugs in one Nomad release batch, not unauthenticated takeover of every cluster. Namespace reads are an ACL issue; host impact requires a malicious workload and the specific write or data-reuse path. Root-level impact requires suitable client-agent privileges and writable host targets. L3 reflects a mainstream scheduler with documented isolation failures; no victim count or active-exploitation claim is supplied.
What’s in the bowl
Cross-namespace read authorization bypass
A token with a relevant read capability in one namespace can disclose objects in other namespaces; single-namespace clusters are unaffected. This does not grant cross-namespace writes.
Symlink following during payload and executor-log writes
A workload that plants allocation symlinks can redirect writes with client-agent privileges. Dispatch payloads require job submission and dispatch permissions; Linux exec/java executor logs require job submission. A root agent can expose the host to root code execution.
Symlink following during allocation data migration
Submitting and updating a job with sticky ephemeral disk reuse on the same client can redirect permission and ownership changes to host directories through a planted symlink. No previous-allocation data reuse means this migration path is not exposed.
Fixed versions
| Product | Safe from | Note |
|---|
| Nomad Community | 2.1.0 | |
| Nomad Enterprise 2.1 | 2.1.0 | |
| Nomad Enterprise 1.11 | 1.11.12 | |
| Nomad Enterprise 1.10 | 1.10.18 | |
Crime-scene timeline
Oct 29, 2026
HashiCorp publishes HCSEC-2026-51, -52 and -53
Who said what
We list each claim and who made it. Primary sources (the vendor, the researcher, the registry) are marked. Where reports disagree, we grade by the worst credible case.