LUKSO email-recovery backend exploit drains about 300 Universal Profiles
LUKSO says a backend flaw let an attacker add a controller to about 300 email-recovery-enabled profiles and take around 1.4 million LYX. The recovery service is off, but existing malicious controllers must still be removed.
- Disclosed
- Nov 18, 2026
- Public disclosure date
- Severity
- Septic Tank Blew
- No CVE: a breach, not a bug
- Splash zone
- Universal Profiles that used LUKSO’s email-based recovery; retained attacker permissions still endanger remaining assets.
- Cryptocurrency · Recovery · Credentials
- In the wild
- Yes
- LUKSO’s postmortem confirms exploited recovery infrastructure and stolen LYX.
What happened
LUKSO attributes the incident to its email-recovery backend, not its blockchain or Universal Profile contracts. It reports no leaked private keys or recovery phrases and excludes profiles that never used email recovery; these are vendor claims. Its approximate 1.4 million LYX figure is a reported theft amount, not the roughly 50 ETH obtained after bridging and swaps (valued by the postmortem at about $95,000). Do not equate those quantities or infer a market-price guarantee from the vendor’s statement that the stolen tokens were sold. Existing unauthorized controllers remain dangerous even after service shutdown.
Crime-scene timeline
Nov 17–18, 2026
Email-recovery backend exploited
LUKSO reports takeover of recovery-service profiles and unauthorized controllers added to approximately 300 user profiles.
Nov 18, 2026
Postmortem and removal instructions published
The recovery service is disabled and being decommissioned. Reimbursement arrangements remain in development, not completed compensation.
Who said what
We list each claim and who made it. Primary sources (the vendor, the researcher, the registry) are marked. Where reports disagree, we grade by the worst credible case.
- LUKSO original postmortemPrimaryReports backend exploitation, approximate profile and LYX figures, scope exclusions, shutdown, controller-removal steps and planned reimbursement.
- Incident checker linked by LUKSOPrimaryWarns about retained super permissions, hidden controllers, re-registration and the limits of its read-only check.
- Published incident address listPrimaryLists one attacker controller and ten recovery profiles for the read-only permission check.