Malicious GitHub issue and PR text reached shell execution in two Actions workflows
Radware found 83 malicious items targeting 61 repositories and evidence of command execution in two Actions workflows. The September campaign exploited unsafe interpolation of issue or PR text into shell scripts; downstream software compromise was not established.
- Disclosed
- Oct 29, 2026
- Public disclosure date
- Severity
- Septic Tank Blew
- No CVE: a breach, not a bug
- Splash zone
- Actions workflows inserting externally controlled titles, bodies or comments directly into shell code
- github-actions
- In the wild
- Yes
- Radware finds execution in two September workflows; 61 is the target count.
What happened
Posting untrusted text is sufficient only when vulnerable automation processes it; merging a PR is unnecessary. Radware identifies execution evidence in PX4/PX4-Autopilot and Snouzy/workout-cool. Its counts are researcher findings, not independently verified here. Successful secret delivery, repository write access and altered downstream releases remain unconfirmed. The report publishes three collection-path examples, not all 83 identifiers; absence of these examples cannot clear a workflow.
Crime-scene timeline
Sep 1, 2026
Two attack waves post malicious GitHub content
Oct 29, 2026
Radware publishes campaign and execution analysis
Who said what
We list each claim and who made it. Primary sources (the vendor, the researcher, the registry) are marked. Where reports disagree, we grade by the worst credible case.