Description
On 2026-05-11, between approximately 19:20 and 19:26 UTC, 84 malicious versions across 42 @tanstack/* packages were published to the npm registry. The publishes were authenticated via the legitimate GitHub Actions OIDC trusted-publisher binding for TanStack/router, but the publish workflow itself was not modified. The attacker chained three known vulnerability classes — a pull_request_target "Pwn Request" misconfiguration, GitHub Actions cache poisoning across the fork↔base trust boundary, and runtime memory extraction of the OIDC token from the Actions runner process — to publish credential-stealing malware under a trusted identity. Each affected package received exactly two malicious versions, published a few minutes apart.
References
- www.cve.org/CVERecord ↗
- nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-45321 ↗
- github.com/TanStack/router/issues/7383 ↗
- github.com/TanStack/router/security/advisories/GHSA-g7cv-rxg3-hmpx ↗
- tanstack.com/blog/npm-supply-chain-compromise-postmortem ↗
- www.stepsecurity.io/blog/mini-shai-hulud-is-back-a-self-spreading-supply-chain-attack-hits-the-npm-ecosystem ↗
- www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog ↗
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