{
  "id": "rootways-apple-pay-ssrf",
  "url": "https://ohshit.app/incidents/rootways-apple-pay-ssrf/",
  "title": "Rootways Apple Pay flaw used to plant a payment skimmer on a Magento store",
  "level": 4,
  "level_name": "septic-tank-blew",
  "date": "2026-11-17",
  "date_is_approximate": false,
  "updated": null,
  "tags": [
    "Magento",
    "SSRF",
    "skimmer",
    "e-commerce"
  ],
  "ecosystems": [
    "php",
    "magento"
  ],
  "summary": "Attackers exploited CVE-2026-130583 in the Rootways Authorize.net CIM Pro extension for Magento 2 to read secrets, gain admin access and install a card skimmer on one store investigated by Sansec. Upgrade to 4.1.5 or use the vendor patch.",
  "splash": "Magento 2 stores with the Apple Pay edition of Rootways Authorize.net CIM Pro before 4.1.5.",
  "wipe": "Upgrade the extension to 4.1.5 or apply the vendor patch. Investigate and rotate secrets if the endpoint was exposed.",
  "in_the_wild": "yes",
  "source_exception": null,
  "cves": [
    {
      "id": "CVE-2026-130583",
      "score": 9.2,
      "name": "Unauthenticated Apple Pay validation SSRF",
      "description": "The merchant validation controller fetches attacker-supplied URLs and returns their contents, exposing local files and internal services."
    }
  ],
  "fixed": [
    {
      "product": "Rootways Authorize.net CIM Pro",
      "version": "4.1.5",
      "status": "First patched release"
    }
  ],
  "checklist": [
    {
      "title": "Identify and patch every affected installation",
      "hint": "Run `composer show rootways/module-authorizecim` or check `app/code/Rootways/Authorizecim/composer.json` for manual installs. Upgrade to 4.1.5 or later even if Apple Pay is off, or apply the vendor patch to `Controller/ApplePay/Index.php` and `view/frontend/web/js/applepay/button.js` in the extension. Contact help@rootways.com if your Marketplace channel has no fixed release."
    },
    {
      "title": "Restrict the validation endpoint while patching",
      "hint": "If you can suspend Apple Pay, disable it with `payment/rootways_authorizecim_option_applepay/active` set to `0`, flush the Magento cache, and block `/rootways_authorizecim/applepay/index` at the web server. Test that the block works from outside the store. Apply the patch even if you have blocked the route."
    },
    {
      "title": "Preserve logs and look for signs of exploitation",
      "hint": "Search HTTP logs for the Apple Pay endpoint with unexpected `validationUrl` hosts, non-HTTPS schemes or injected PHP in `z`. Sansec’s indicator table has the full request, file, hash and marker list. Network indicators include 45-86-62-180[.]sslip[.]io, 45.86.62.180, 37.72.140.221, 45.166.20.61, 54.39.16.34 and 2.27.168.28. A match alone does not prove compromise."
    },
    {
      "title": "Contain compromised stores and replace exposed secrets",
      "hint": "If compromise is suspected, isolate affected hosts and preserve logs and disk and database snapshots. Inspect `admin_user` for unexpected accounts, review `design/head/includes` in `core_config_data` and inspect the web root for skimmers and shells such as `pub/media_sync.php`. Restore clean code and configuration, rotate the database password and rotate `crypt/key` in `app/etc/env.php` using Adobe’s instructions for your release. For 2.4.8, use `bin/magento encryption:key:change` in maintenance mode with cron paused, then follow Adobe’s re-encryption and cache instructions. Remove unauthorized admins, end affected sessions, review integration credentials, protect Redis with authentication, restrict Adminer to trusted IPs and coordinate any potential card exposure with your payment processor."
    }
  ],
  "sources": [
    {
      "name": "Rootways security advisory",
      "url": "https://www.rootways.com/blog/security-update-authorizenet-cim-pro-extension-v415-apple-pay",
      "says": "Confirms the affected edition, version 4.1.5 and the two-file patch.",
      "primary": true
    },
    {
      "name": "Sansec forensic investigation",
      "url": "https://sansec.io/research/rootways-authorize-net-apple-pay-ssrf",
      "says": "Documents exploitation at a Magento store and provides mitigation steps and indicators.",
      "primary": true
    },
    {
      "name": "VulnCheck CNA record",
      "url": "https://cveawg.mitre.org/api/cve/CVE-2026-130583",
      "says": "Identifies affected releases before 4.1.5 and rates the flaw 9.2 under CVSS 4.0.",
      "primary": true
    },
    {
      "name": "Adobe Commerce encryption key guidance",
      "url": "https://experienceleague.adobe.com/en/docs/commerce-admin/systems/security/encryption-key",
      "says": "Explains key rotation, the CLI requirement for 2.4.8 and when to re-encrypt data.",
      "primary": true
    }
  ],
  "headline": null,
  "one_liner": null,
  "in_the_wild_note": "Sansec investigated an exploited Magento store running extension version 4.0.0.",
  "mitigation": null,
  "timeline": [
    {
      "date": "Nov 14, 22:58 UTC",
      "title": "Probing begins at the store later investigated by Sansec",
      "body": "Investigators saw attempts against several other Magento flaws before the Apple Pay endpoint was exploited."
    },
    {
      "date": "Nov 15, 2026",
      "title": "Attackers exploit the validation endpoint and install a skimmer",
      "body": "They obtain database credentials, create an admin account, gain code execution and inject a loader into storefront pages."
    },
    {
      "date": "Nov 16, 2026",
      "title": "Sansec identifies and reports the flaw to Rootways"
    },
    {
      "date": "Nov 17, 2026",
      "title": "Rootways ships 4.1.5 and VulnCheck publishes the CVE",
      "body": "Sansec publishes its investigation, mitigation steps and indicators."
    }
  ],
  "body_markdown": "An unauthenticated request to the extension’s Apple Pay merchant validation endpoint can make Magento fetch an attacker-selected URL and send back the response. The request can read files accessible to Magento’s PHP process or reach services that are normally internal. Sansec says the patch restricts the destination to Apple Pay gateway URLs over HTTPS and disables redirects.\n\nSansec investigated a Magento 2.4.8 store running Rootways 4.0.0 with Apple Pay enabled. The attacker read database credentials and the Magento encryption key from `app/etc/env.php`, used the exposed credentials through an internal Adminer instance to add an administrator, and got code execution through a template preview. The attacker then deployed a web shell and injected a loader designed to send card fields to a WebSocket collector. Sansec documents one store and does not give a count of affected cardholders or confirmed losses.\n\nIf you cannot update the full extension immediately, use the two-file patch linked in the [Rootways advisory](https://www.rootways.com/blog/security-update-authorizenet-cim-pro-extension-v415-apple-pay). Rootways says its edition without Apple Pay is unaffected. Apply the fix if you use the Apple Pay edition, even with the feature switched off. If the route was exposed, check for persistence and stolen credentials before returning the store to normal service."
}