{
  "id": "reental-rnt-lend-admin",
  "url": "https://ohshit.app/incidents/reental-rnt-lend-admin/",
  "title": "Reental RNT Lend drained after privileged contract upgrades",
  "level": 4,
  "level_name": "septic-tank-blew",
  "date": "2026-11-18",
  "date_is_approximate": false,
  "updated": null,
  "tags": [
    "DeFi",
    "Polygon",
    "RNT Lend"
  ],
  "ecosystems": [],
  "summary": "Blockaid reports malicious upgrades to RNT Lend’s stablecoin markets. Bitquery estimates $954,703 removed, including funds outside the initial pool drain, and says property tokens were clawed back. Who controlled the admin key remains unproven.",
  "splash": "Reental RNT Lend stablecoin lenders and affected managed wallets/Safes on Polygon",
  "wipe": "Avoid new RNT Lend deposits or repayments pending verified remediation; retain records and contact Reental.",
  "in_the_wild": "yes",
  "source_exception": null,
  "cves": [],
  "fixed": [],
  "checklist": [
    {
      "title": "Avoid sending more funds into affected markets",
      "hint": "Bitquery found the pool unpaused and repayments exposed at its November 18 snapshot. Confirm a verified Reental fix before new deposits or repayments."
    },
    {
      "title": "Preserve records and obtain project instructions",
      "hint": "Keep transaction and position records; ask Reental about claims and withdrawal access. Returned property tokens do not establish stablecoin reimbursement."
    },
    {
      "title": "Consult the full evidence list",
      "hint": "Bitquery’s record has 16 addresses and five transaction hashes covering the pool, markets, admin, bots, Safes and bridges. Use the full linked list; a match alone proves neither compromise nor shared ownership."
    }
  ],
  "sources": [
    {
      "name": "Blockaid original alert",
      "url": "https://x.com/blockaid_/status/2123033403553689899",
      "says": "Full public embed reports an admin upgrade enabling unrestricted aToken withdrawals and an early roughly $454K drain.",
      "primary": true
    },
    {
      "name": "Bitquery original investigation",
      "url": "https://bitquery.io/investigations/reental-rnt-lend-drain",
      "says": "Expands scope, separates clawed-back property tokens and gives snapshot, attribution and ownership limitations.",
      "primary": true
    }
  ],
  "headline": null,
  "one_liner": null,
  "in_the_wild_note": "Blockaid reports an exploit; Bitquery traces admin upgrades and fund removal.",
  "mitigation": null,
  "timeline": [
    {
      "date": "Nov 18, 2026",
      "title": "Blockaid reports malicious aToken upgrades",
      "body": "The early roughly $454K estimate covers only part of the activity."
    },
    {
      "date": "Nov 18, 16:17 UTC",
      "title": "Bitquery snapshots the expanded drain",
      "body": "Its attributed estimate is $954,703 in stablecoins; returned property tokens are separate from stablecoin recovery."
    }
  ],
  "body_markdown": "Privileged upgrades made RNT Lend’s USDT0/USDC markets drainable, according to Blockaid and Bitquery. Bitquery attributes $454,825 to two bots and about $499,877 to the keyholder; rounded subtotals need not sum exactly. Its $49.34M property-token valuation uses pool prices, and those tokens were clawed back—not an additional permanent loss.\n\nBitquery cannot establish whether the key was stolen or used by an insider. Its November 18 snapshot is not a current restoration guarantee. Confirmed malicious upgrades and fund removal support L4; a project postmortem and final accounting remain outstanding.\n\nThe expanded $954,703 total remains unverified by a second source or Reental; treat it as Bitquery’s estimate."
}