{
  "id": "onlyoffice-document-server-trust",
  "url": "https://ohshit.app/incidents/onlyoffice-document-server-trust/",
  "title": "ONLYOFFICE Docs view-only access can lead to container root",
  "level": 3,
  "level_name": "sharted",
  "date": "2026-11-16",
  "date_is_approximate": false,
  "updated": null,
  "tags": [
    "ONLYOFFICE",
    "Document Server",
    "Docker",
    "JWT"
  ],
  "ecosystems": [],
  "summary": "Rapid7 demonstrated two chains from view-only document access to root in the official ONLYOFFICE Document Server container. A separate entry path needs no existing account or token when WOPI is enabled and the server can reach an attacker-controlled source allowed by the WOPI filter.",
  "splash": "Demonstrated on official Document Server 9.4.0-129. The full affected range of the combined findings is unknown.",
  "wipe": "Upgrade to supported Document Server 10.0.0 or later. Until then, restrict access and disable unused WOPI integrations.",
  "in_the_wild": "unknown",
  "source_exception": null,
  "cves": [
    {
      "id": "CVE-2026-113627",
      "score": 7.1,
      "name": "DocBuilder native file read and session forgery",
      "description": "An accepted editor token can authorize file reads that expose signing material for forged session tokens."
    },
    {
      "id": "CVE-2026-110385",
      "score": 8.7,
      "name": "DocBuilder output path injection",
      "description": "An Inbox-compatible token can reach a conversion job that writes outside the intended job directory and leads to command execution as ds."
    },
    {
      "id": "CVE-2026-97727",
      "score": 6.5,
      "name": "Complete-save path traversal",
      "description": "A session token can reach a save path that writes outside the intended destination."
    },
    {
      "id": "CVE-2026-113630",
      "score": 7.8,
      "name": "Privileged maintenance helper command injection",
      "description": "Code execution as ds in the official container can escalate to root through a helper allowed by sudoers."
    },
    {
      "id": "CVE-2026-113631",
      "score": 6.5,
      "name": "View-only export bypass",
      "description": "A viewer can export hidden document data even when download and form filling are disabled."
    }
  ],
  "fixed": [
    {
      "product": "ONLYOFFICE Document Server",
      "version": "10.0.0"
    }
  ],
  "checklist": [
    {
      "title": "Upgrade Document Server and check the running version",
      "hint": "Check the runtime package or image and your integration’s compatibility. Back up persistent data and retain the configured mounts and secrets. Follow the vendor's update guide for your edition, confirm the running version, and test that a restricted user can view only what was shared and that authorized users can still edit and save."
    },
    {
      "title": "Limit exposure until upgrade",
      "hint": "Disable WOPI if unused. If required, restrict WOPI sources to known integrations and use egress controls to prevent the server reaching untrusted sources. Limit public access and external sharing on unpatched servers. These measures do not fix the view-only token path."
    },
    {
      "title": "Investigate suspicious access before rebuilding or rotating secrets",
      "hint": "Preserve container, reverse proxy, integration and host logs. Look for unexpected requests to /docbuilder or the WOPI launch endpoint, changes to runtime.json, unusual callback destinations and shells launched by the document service or its cache helper. A match alone does not establish compromise. If compromise is suspected, isolate the workload, check the host and mounted data, rebuild from a clean image and rotate exposed JWT keys and integration credentials before restoring access."
    }
  ],
  "sources": [
    {
      "name": "Rapid7 coordinated disclosure and technical analysis",
      "url": "https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/ve-from-view-only-access-to-container-root-five-vulnerabilities-in-onlyoffice-docs-fixed/",
      "says": "Documents the five findings, test builds, prerequisites, proofs of concept and vendor confirmation of fixes.",
      "primary": true
    },
    {
      "name": "ONLYOFFICE Document Server changelog",
      "url": "https://github.com/ONLYOFFICE/DocumentServer/blob/master/CHANGELOG.md",
      "says": "Lists security changes in 10.0.0, including fixes to DocBuilder and WOPI.",
      "primary": true
    },
    {
      "name": "ONLYOFFICE Community Edition Docker update guide",
      "url": "https://helpcenter.onlyoffice.com/docs/installation/community/docker/update",
      "says": "Explains how to update the Docker installation and preserve its mapped directories.",
      "primary": true
    },
    {
      "name": "CVE record for the DocBuilder output path flaw",
      "url": "https://cveawg.mitre.org/api/cve/CVE-2026-110385",
      "says": "Records the earlier disclosure and describes code execution as ds before 10.0.0.",
      "primary": true
    }
  ],
  "headline": null,
  "one_liner": null,
  "in_the_wild_note": "Rapid7 published working proofs of concept and did not report real-world exploitation.",
  "mitigation": null,
  "timeline": [
    {
      "date": "Oct 14, 2026",
      "title": "DocBuilder output path CVE is published",
      "body": "The public CVE describes the file write and execution as the document service account."
    },
    {
      "date": "Oct 23, 2026",
      "title": "ONLYOFFICE confirms the five fixes to Rapid7",
      "body": "Rapid7 says the vendor confirmed that Document Server 10.0 fixed all five findings."
    },
    {
      "date": "Nov 16, 2026",
      "title": "Rapid7 discloses the combined paths and publishes test code",
      "body": "The researcher demonstrates container root from a view-only session and from the conditional WOPI entry."
    }
  ],
  "body_markdown": "Rapid7 tested the official 9.4.0 image with package 9.4.0-129, JWT checks enabled, and Browser and Inbox validation using the same effective key. The two chains use a shared DocBuilder authorization weakness but different file-write paths. Each reaches execution as the document service account and then abuses a maintenance helper to obtain root inside the container. The report does not demonstrate a container escape.\n\nThe alternate entry requires the non-default WOPI feature, network reachability from Document Server to an attacker-controlled WOPI source, and a filter that allows that source. Under those conditions, Rapid7 demonstrated both chains without a pre-existing account or token. Separately, a viewer can export a reconstructed DOCX containing items such as custom XML and field instructions that were never rendered.\n\nONLYOFFICE confirmed all five fixes in Document Server 10.0. Rapid7 ran targeted checks on package 10.0.0-169. The aggregate affected range beyond the tested vulnerable package is unknown. The independently disclosed CVE-2026-110385 covers versions before 10.0.0 under its own prerequisites."
}